In 1958 Gödel published his Dialectica interpretation, which reduces classical arithmetic to a quantifier-free theory T axiomatizing the primitive recursive functionals of finite type. Here we extend Gödel's T to theories Pn of "predicative" functionals, which are defined using MartinLöf's universes of transfinite types. We then extend Gödel's interpretation to the theories of arithmetic inductive definitions IDn, so that each IDn is interpreted in the corresponding Pn. Since the strengths of the theories IDn are cofinal in the ordinal Γ0, as a corollary this analysis provides an ordinal-free characterization of the <Γ0-recursive functions.
Introduction

Background
In 1958, Gödel [18] published what is now known as the Dialectica interpretation of arithmetic, consisting of a quantifier-free theory T and interpretation of Peano Arithmetic (P A) in that theory. T allows for the definition of functionals of arbitrary finite type using a generalized form of primitive recursion, and at the end of the article Gödel suggested that extensions of T could be constructed using "transfinite" types of some sort.
The question we address here is as follows: are there interesting extensions of T that are appropriate for the interpretation of stronger predicative theories, that is, theories of proof-theoretic strength less than or equal to Γ 0 ? MartinLöf's theories of constructive mathematics [9, 22, 23, 24, 12, 8, 34, 36] offer a natural means of extension, by incorporating a rich type-building structure based on "universes" of types. We show here that these universes are sufficient for the purpose just described.
First, we present theories P 0 , P 1 , . . . , axiomatizing what we are calling the "predicative" functionals. The theories P n are bare-bones versions of MartinLof's theories M L n , and are ordinal-free in that no mention of ordinals is made in the defining schemata or axioms. We then show how, via a sequence of syntactical manipulations, each of the theories ID n can be interpreted in the corresponding P n . ID 0 is just P A and P 0 is a logic-free variant of T , so in the initial case our interpretation is essentially the same as Gödel's.
The theories ID n are so named because they allow one to define sets of natural numbers using a weak form of arithmetic inductive definition. Each ID n has proof-theoretic ordinal ordinal γ n , where γ n forms a sequence that is cofinal in the Feferman-Schütte ordinal Γ 0 . The union of these theories, ID <ω , therefore has strength Γ 0 itself.
In [6] we show that the theory AT R 0 , which is of just the right strength to formalize some important mathematical arguments (see [28, 29, 16] ), is conservative over ID <ω for arithmetic formulas. As a result, the work here characterizes the provably total recursive functions of both these theories.
In recent years a number of other theories have been reduced to versions of Martin-Löf's. Most of these reductions are carried out in the "formulas-astypes" framework (see [12, 19] ). For example, Aczel [2, 4] interprets constructive set theory, and Palmgren [25] interprets intuitionistic versions of the theories ID n . But while the formulas-as-types framework (which bears a close kinship to Kleene's modified realizability; see [32] ) provides an elegant setting for the interpretation of constructive mathematics, it does not seem to provide the means to interpret classical theories. In particular, modified realizability does not verify Markov's principle for primitive-recursive predicates, and so does not directly provide a characterization of a classical theory's provable functions.
At present, many reductions of classical theories to constructive ones pass through the ordinal analysis of the former. We believe that the direct reduction of classical theories to constructive ones is an illuminating way of extracting their "constructive content," thereby complementing the gains of an ordinal analysis. To that end, functional interpretation seems to offer a fruitful approach. We hope that the results reported here will spark further research along these lines, motivated by the question: "What computational principles are needed to interpret stronger classical theories?"
Overview
In Section 2 we introduce axiomatizations of first-and second-order logic that are amenable to our interpretations, and define the relevant theories of firstorder and second-order arithmetic, including ID n and Σ 1 1 −AC. In Section 3 we define the purely equational theories P n . Under a natural identification of quantifier-free formulas ϕ in the language of arithmetic with assertions ϕ in the language of P 0 , our main theorem can be stated as follows: Theorem 1.1 Each theory ID n is interpreted (in the sense of [21] ) in the corresponding P n . In particular, if ID n proves ∀x ∃y ϕ(x, y), where ϕ is a quantifier-free formula in the language of arithmetic, there is a term t such that P n proves ϕ (x, t(x)).
This implies that each provably total recursive function of ID n is represented by a term of P n . In Section 3.2 we point out that the converse is also true, so that the provably total recursive functions of ID n are exactly the ones so represented.
The interpretations are defined iteratively. In Section 4 we recast the Dialectica interpretation in our framework, as follows:
First P A is interpreted in a variant P A i based on a fragment of intuitionistic logic, and this in turn is interpreted in P 0 .
In Section 5, we describe a four-step interpretation of ID 1 in P 1 :
First, we interpret the fixed-point constants of ID 1 by Σ 1 1 formulas in the theory Σ 1 1 -AC; this step is due to Aczel. A "double-negation" interpretation reduces Σ -AC down to quantifier-free formulas of Frege-P A i . The final interpretation of Frege-P A i in P 1 builds on the interpretation of P A in P 0 : because P 1 has a universe of small types, it can "internalize" the Dialectica interpretation and therefore handle the reflected arithmetic formulas of Frege-P A i . In Section 6, we sketch an interpretation of ID 2 in P 2 , which relies on the interpretation of ID 1 in P 1 . Iterating this process yields the main result.
In [6] we present an effective proof of the following In other words, our interpretation characterizes the provably total recursive functions of both theories. The work described here builds on not only the Dialectica interpretation, but also work due to Feferman [15] and Aczel regarding ID <ω ; nonconstructive Dialectica-style interpretations due to Feferman (see [13] ); and Martin-Löf's theories. Though familiarity with these results will provide some context for ones described here, we have tried to keep this account self-contained. A more detailed presentation can be found in [5] . 1 2 The Relevant Theories of Arithmetic
Predicate logic
Below we use the term "theory" quite broadly, applying it to any system of axioms and rules of derivation. So, for example, the theory Σ 1 1 -AC consists of a certain set of axioms, combined with the usual rules for forming terms and formulas in the language of second-order arithmetic, and a set of axioms and rules of classical predicate logic. The theory Σ it is based on a fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic. Finally, P 1 is an entirely different type of theory, with rules of derivation and term formation that interleave with one another. In each case we'll take the notation T ϕ and the phrase "T proves ϕ" to mean that ϕ can be derived from the axioms and rules of T , and an interpretation of T 1 in T 2 translates derivations in T 1 to derivations in T 2 .
We want to emphasize that the symbol " " doesn't imply any particular choice of underlying logic. For example, if a theory is built on classical logic, we will always specify this as part of the theory. In this section we present axiomatizations of first-and second-order classical predicate logic, denoted respectively by C 1 and C 2 , and then pick out intuitionistically justified fragments I 1 and I 2 . By "second-order logic" we really mean a two-sorted logic with variables ranging over objects and sets, and an ∈ relation between the two: semantically, we don't assume that the second-order variables range over the entire power set of the universe of objects, and the logic itself doesn't include any set comprehension axioms.
We fix ∀, ∧, →, and ⊥ (false) as our basic connectives, defining ¬ϕ as ϕ → ⊥. Our reason for doing so is that classical and intuitionistic logic agree on these connectives, a convenient fact that will facilitate our interpretations. We define ϕ ∨ ψ as ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and ∃x ϕ as ¬∀x ¬ϕ, but note that although these definitions are classically justified, they are not adequate definitions for the corresponding intuitionistic connectives. If ϕ(x) is a term or formula with free variable x, we will write ϕ(t) to represent the formula obtained by replacing free instances of x by t, changing the bound variables of ϕ(x) to prevent clashes, if necessary.
Many axiomatizations of predicate logic include all propositional tautologies, but to verify our interpretations we need to choose a finite set of schemata. Troelstra [32] provides a number of suitable candidates, due to Gödel [18] , Kleene, and Spector [30] . The axioms presented here are Spector's, with the axioms regarding ∨ and ∃ removed, and the law of the excluded middle expressed in the form ¬¬ϕ → ϕ.
Axioms and rules of propositional logic
The diligent reader can check that the remaining axioms on Spector's list can be derived from these, once ∨ and ∃ are defined as described above.
Quantifier axioms and rules
If ϕ → ψ(x)
, and x is not free in ϕ, then ϕ → ∀x ψ(x)
∀x ϕ(x) → ϕ(t), for any term t whose variables are not bound in ϕ(t).
For second-order logic, which has variables and quantifiers ranging over two different sorts, these quantifier rules are duplicated for each sort. The language of second-order logic also has a fixed binary relation symbol ∈ to denote membership between objects of the two sorts. Finally, both logics come equipped with an equality symbol for first-order terms, governed by the axioms below.
Equality axioms and rules
The symmetry and transitivity of equality can be derived from these. We do not include a separate equality symbol for second-order terms, but rather define
Of the propositional axioms given above, only axiom 10, the law of the excluded middle, is not intuitionistically valid. We therefore define I 1 and I 2 to consist of C 1 and C 2 respectively, with this axiom removed. We need to emphasize the fact that I 1 and I 2 represent only a fragment of the usual intuitionistic predicate logic, since they have nothing to say about the connectives ∨ and ∃. As it turns out, this fragment is sufficient for our interpretations, and ignoring the latter connectives shortens our task considerably.
In this setting, Gödel's "double negation" interpretation simply adds a doublenegation before atomic formulas; that is, we define ⊥ N to be ⊥, ϕ N to be ¬¬ϕ for atomic ϕ, and otherwise let the · N translation commute with →, ∧, and ∀. (If we had included ∨ and ∃ among the basic connectives, the · N mapping would replace them with the classically equivalent definitions mentioned above.) We then have
To prove this one only needs to show that the claim is true of the axioms of each C j and is maintained under the rules of interence. All the axioms and rules of each C j other than propositional axiom 10 reduce to their counterparts in I j , and a straightforward induction on formula complexity shows that the translation of the law of the excluded middle
is also derivable. (One uses the fact that in general formulas of the form ¬¬¬ψ → ¬ψ are intuitionisitically valid and provable from the axioms of I j .) For a full axiomatization of intuitionistic logic, or for more information on its relationship to classical logic, see [8, 32, 33, 36] .
The theories ID n
The language of Peano Arithmetic is a first-order language containing a constant symbol 0, a unary function symbol S denoting the successor operation, and binary function symbols + and ×. Peano Arithmetic consists of classical predicate logic C 1 together with the following axioms and rules, where x abbreviates S(x).
Axioms of Peano Arithmetic
The usual axiomatic form of induction follows easily from the last rule.
ID 0 is another name for P A. The language of ID 1 extends that of P A by adding an additional predicate P ϕ for each arithmetic formula ϕ(n, X) in which a new predicate X occurs only positively. ("Occurs postively" means that if ϕ is expressed solely in terms of ¬, ∧, and ∀, then X only occurs within the scope of an even number of negations.) Such an arithmetic formula defines a set function
given by
positivity insures this function is monotone, i.e. for any sets A and
. Classically such a function has a fixed point, and the predicate P ϕ is intended to denote such a set. 2 Consequently, the axioms of ID 1 consist of the axioms of P A with induction extended to formulas involving the new predicates, and an axiom
for each P ϕ . The move from ID 0 to ID 1 can be iterated, whereby each theory ID n+1 adds new constants for positive arithmetic formulas in the language of ID n and the corresponding fixed-point axioms. Taking the union of all these theories yields ID <ω ; see [15] for more details. 
for arithmetic formulas ϕ, possibly with set parameters other than X. To state the remaining axiom of Σ 1 1 -AC, we define m ∈ X n to mean n, m ∈ X, so that X can be interpreted as coding a countable sequence of sets X n . The Σ 2 In fact, every monotone set function has a least fixed point, and the stronger theory ID 1 has additional axioms which assert that Pϕ is contained in any other arithmetically-defined fixed point. See [10, 1] . 3 Note that the presentation in [15] adds only one new constant at each stage, so that each
IDn has only n new constants. This difference is inessential, since in any proof in our version of IDn one can "collapse" all the fixed-point constants of each iterative depth to a single one.
where ϕ is any Σ 1 1 formula. By coding pairs of sets as a single set we can assume that ϕ is in fact arithmetic, since we can always "absorb" an existentially quantified set in X.
More generally, Σ 1 1 -AC( ID n ) is defined the same way except that we start with the language and axioms of ID n instead of P A and add (ACA) and (Σ In this section we describe the functional theories P n . P 0 is just a logic-free version of Gödel's T , while the theories P n gain added strength through the use of "universes," which allow one to contruct transfinite types. Each P n is essentially a bare-bones version of Martin-Löf's M L n , described in more detail in [9, 22, 23, 24, 12, 8, 34, 36] .
We start with an infinite stock of variables w, x, y, z, . . . . Terms are built up from variables and constants as described by the rules below. As in Martin-Löf's type theories, we allow for four different kinds of assertions, or judgements: 
to assert that a is a term of type A, on the assumption that the variable x is of type B and y is of type C. Such a list of assumptions is often called a "context" and the corresponding relationship between contexts and type judgements is sometimes written
Below, however, we'll stick with the first notation.
Variables occuring in terms can be free or bound. If we want to emphasize that the variable x can occur freely in the term a we'll write it as a [x] , and we'll use the notation a[b/x] to denote the term obtained by replacing every free occurance of x in a by the term b. Although we won't spell out the details of when a variable is free or bound, the rules are as one would expect: for example, x occurs freely in the term x, but becomes bound in the terms λx.a, Π x∈A B [x] , and Σ x∈A B [x] .
In presenting the rules below, we omit type assumptions that are unchanged in the conclusion. We also often leave type assumptions on terms implicit, so that the rule expressing the symmetry of equality,
We will sometimes even omit the type of an equality judgement, writing
to define the projection function and leaving the reader to fill in the necessary type assumptions. For a more complete discussion of issues such as these we refer the reader to [9, 34] . We've divided the rules into four groups, depending on the form of their conclusion:
The exception is the group of rules allowing us to state induction in the theory. These appear last. Notice that the reflection rule allows one to define types that depend on variables, so that the types of P 0 , which has no universes, are just the finite types of Gödel's T .
Equality of Types in
Note that the first rule says that an equality that holds of objects in a universe is transfered to the corresponding types. One again, this rule is unavailable in P 0 .
Substitution of equal types:
In the application rule, b(a) is shorthand for a formal term Apply(b, a). To increase readability, if a is a term of an appropriate type, we'll use a(b, c) as an abbreviation for (a(b))(c). It will also be convenient, for objects c ∈ Σ x∈A B, to use the notations c 0 and c 1 for the projections π 0 (c) and π 1 (c) respectively. As usual, x denotes S(x).
We haven't yet described rules for building terms to denote elements of the universes. Though they really belong with the previous group, we present them separately in the following list.
Terms of universes of P n 1. Natural numbers:
All the rules above are duplicated for each i < n. These rules "reflect" typebuilding operations down into the universes, and therefore look much the same as P n 's ordinary type-building rules.
Next we present the rules that allow one to conclude that two terms of P n are equal.
Equality of terms in P n 1. Reflexivity:
7. Substitution of equal terms:
8. Substitution of equal types:
Finally, we define terms that allow us to express implication between assertions of equality of type N objects, and induction.
Logical Axioms of P n 
Substitution: implies(equals(a, b), equals(c[a/x], c[b/x])) = 0
6. Induction rule:
7. Equality transfer:
The idea behind the function implies is that numerical variables can be interpreted as propositional variables, where 0 denotes "true" and any nonzero value denotes "false." So, for example, using appropriate substitution and identity rules we can have the following Lemma 3.1 Modus ponens is a derived rule of P n ; that is, we can derive the rule
Similarly, equals(a, b) = 0 asserts that a and b represent the same number. We could have defined both implies and equals using primitive recursion, but then verifying that they satisfy the defining properties above would require some kind of induction rule, which is what we are using them to state. The final rule allows us to transfer equality assertions of the form equals(a, b) = 0 to assertions of the form a = b ∈ N. This allows us, for example, to use induction to derive the commutativity of the primitive recursively defined multiplication function. On the other hand, our interpretations will rely on the equals function rather than type N equality to interpret the equality symbol in the language of arithmetic. As a result, for our purposes, the transfer rule is unnecessary; we could just as well have omitted it.
We define the theory P <ω to be the union of the theories P n . In P 0 one can define primitive recursive functions such as addition, multiplication, the predecessor function, and truncated subtraction in the usual way. For each type A, we can also use primitive recursion and explicit definition to define a function cases
When dealing with systems with multiple universes, it may be helpful to keep the following picture in mind:
By reflection anything in U 0 is in U 1 , anything in U 1 is in U 2 , and so on; and anything in any of the universes is a type. Note that the passage from P n to P n+1 by adding a universe U n actually allows us to define more terms in the smaller universes. For example, in P 0 we can do nothing more than define the finite types. Once we add the universe U 0 , we can still define these types as elements of U 0 , but we can do more: for example, we can use primitive recursion to define a function T ∈ N → U 0 by T (0) = N and T (x ) = T (x) → T (x), and then conclude that Π n∈N T (n) is an element of U 0 , and hence a type.
The strength of the theories P n
Our theories P n are strongly derivative of Martin-Löf's theories M L n , employing n universes and intensional equality, but lacking the W (well-foundedness) types. The differences between the theories stem from differences in underlying motivation. Martin-Löf's theories provide a powerful framework for constructive mathematics in which mathematical statements ϕ are associated with types T ϕ ; the classical assertion that ϕ is true is associated with the constructive assertion that the type T ϕ is inhabited by a term t witnessing ϕ's truth. This is known as the "formulas-as-types" interpretation, or the "Curry-Howard" isomorphism (see [12, 19] ). To implement this framework, M L n contains a rich assortment of type-forming operations. For example, for each type A and terms a and b of type A there is an associated equality type I(a, b, A). In the intended interpretation, I(a, b, A) is inhabited by a canonical element if and only if a and b represent the same object of type A.
Here we avoid the formulas-as-types framework, and so our systems lack many of the added formalisms of Martin-Löf's. The theories P n can be viewed as minimal extensions of T , and as functional calculi they are conceptually simpler than the theories M L n .
Given functional theories like M L n and P n , it is natural to ask what their models look like. In [32] there is a discussion of a number of different models of T , including the "full" set-theoretic model, models based on recursive functions, and term models. Many of these constructions extend to theories with universes as well (see [36] ). In particular, Beeson [9] extends the "hereditarily effective operations" to form models of the theories M L n , in which terms and types are represented by indices coding corresponding recursive objects. An adequate interpretation of the universe U 0 can be obtained in ID 1 , and, furthermore, each theory ID n can appropriately define n such universes. As a result, each theory M L n can be interpreted in ID n , in such a way that terms of type N → N in M L n correspond to provably total recursive functions in the ID n . Since each P n can be interpreted in the corresponding M L n , we have the following converse to Theorem 1.1:
where {e} denotes the eth recursive function.
Altogether, then, we have the chain of reductions
indicating that the proof-theoretic strength of all these theories is the same.
4 Interpreting Peano Arithmetic in P 0
Interpreting P A in P A i
The first part of the interpretation of P A in P 0 involves reducing the former theory to one that avoids the nonconstructive law of the excluded middle. To that end, we define the theory P A i to consist of the same axioms and rules of P A given in Section 2.2, only this time based on the fragment of intuitionistic logic I 1 .
Proof. If P A proves ϕ, then P A N proves ϕ N in I 1 , so it suffices to show that P A i proves these. But the doubly-negated defining equations for successor, plus, and times are easily provable in P A i , and instances of induction in P A translate to instances of induction in P A i .
In fact, we can do a bit better. Since P A i proves ¬¬x = y → x = y with a double induction on x and y, we could have allowed the · N -translation to leave these atomic formulas alone. For the sake of uniformity, we use the notation · N0 to denote this "do nothing" translation.
Interpreting
In this section we show how to interpret P A i in P 0 . Recall that without universes the types of P 0 are obtained from N using the operations → and ×, and so P 0 is just a logic-free version of T . The interpretation we give here is essentially Gödel's, recast only slightly. As such, we only sketch the details and refer the reader to [35, 18, 30, 33, 32] for more information.
Since P 0 is logic-free, the first thing we have to do is embed the quantifier-free fragment of predicate logic, that is, the axioms and rules dealing with propositional logic and equality. The functions implies and equals were introduced for just this purpose, and allow us to build up logical combinations of assertions of type N equality. We define f alse = 1,
and
and(x, y) = not(implies(x, not(y))).
We can then interpret any propositional combination ϕ of statements of type N equality in P n with a single assertion t ϕ = 0, by replacing a = b ∈ N by equals(a, b) = 0 and then using the logical functions just described. In the context of our functional theories, we will use greek letters ϕ to represent assertions of the form t ϕ = 0. The notation a ≈ b will stand for the assertion equals(a, b) = 0, ϕ ∧ ψ will stand for the assertion and(t ϕ , t ψ ) = 0, and so on. With a little bit of work (see [5] for details), one can prove We use + and × to denote addition and multiplication in P 0 , x−y to denote truncated subtraction, x < y to denote
,
We can then associate quantifier-free formulas ϕ of Peano Arithmetic with formulas ϕ in the language of P 0 . With an easy induction on formula complexity one can prove Lemma 4.3 Let ϕ be a closed quantifier-free formula in the language of P A, and ϕ be the associated formula in P 0 . Then
The idea of using functions to interpret type N equality and propositional connectives is well-known; see, for more information see also [30, 18, 35] . We now turn to the Dialectica interpretation proper. Our version of this interpretation maps every formula ϕ of P A i to a formula ϕ D0 of the form
where A and B are types of P 0 , and f is a term of type A × B → N whose free-variables are the same as those of ϕ. (For the moment, we allow for the possibility that either or both quantifiers are absent, in which case the type of f has to be modified accordingly.) The intepretation is defined in such a way that if P A i proves ϕ, there is a term a ∈ A of P 0 witnessing the existential quantifier in ϕ D0 , in the sense that that P 0 proves f (a, y) = 0 (y ∈ B).
We now define the mapping · D0 . Mapping terms t of P A to terms t D0 ∈ N of P 0 , we define (t 1 = t 2 ) D0 to be t
and ψ D0 is given by
Here only the last line is important (intermediate lines are presented for motivation) and we've suppressed the types for clarity: in the end, u is of type
and v is of type A × D. In the final step we use the sum type and projection operations to combine types, and explicit definition and application so that the net result is of the form given by (1). To simplify the notation below we will omit this final step, but it should be taken as implicit. Assuming ϕ D0 an ψ D0 are given as in the last paragraph, the translation of ϕ ∧ ψ is unsurprising:
⊥ D is defined to be the formula f alse = 0. Finally, suppose the variable u is free in ϕ, and hence ϕ D0 . In that case, (∀u ϕ) D0 is given by the translation
where the variable x is skolemized. Note that if ϕ is a quantifier-free formula of P A i then ϕ D0 is essentially just ϕ . Gödel's main theorem is as follows:
then there is a term a ∈ A whose free variables correspond to those of ϕ such that P 0 proves ϕ D0 (a, y) (y ∈ B).
To prove this theorem one need only show that it holds true of the axioms of P A i , and is maintained under rules of inference. The details are routine and well-known, and so here we only highlight two cases that will be of interest later on.
Assuming ϕ D0 and ψ D0 are as above, to handle the rule ψ ⇒ ϕ → ψ we can assume that there is an a such that P 0 proves ψ D0 (a, z), and we need terms b and c such that P 0 proves
For this purpose we use the following Proof. We can take
Using the lemma, define c(x) = a and b(x, z) = canon B .
To handle the rule ϕ → ψ, ϕ → θ ⇒ ϕ → ψ ∧ θ, we are given terms a, a , b, and c such that
We want terms e, f , and g such that
If we define f (x) = b(x), g(x) = c(x), and
we can show
and a(x, z) ).
By substitition we can replace b(x) by f (x) in (2) and c(x) by g(x) in (3)
. Equation (4) now follows using ordinary propositional logic. The other axioms are readily taken care of; see, for example, [32, 30] for details. Note that since ¬ϕ is defined as ϕ → ⊥, the translation of the axiom ¬¬ϕ → ϕ is not in general verifiable in P 0 , which explains our reliance on I 1 .
Theorem 4.4 yields a characterization of the provably total recursive functions of P A:
Corollary 4.6 Suppose P A proves ∀x ∃y ϕ(x, y) where ϕ(x, y) is quantifier free. Then there is a term t such that P 0 proves ϕ (x, t(x)) (x ∈ N ).
In particular, if P A proves a quantifier-free ϕ, P 0 proves ϕ , and if P A proves ⊥ then P 0 proves 1 = 0.
The · D0 mapping as we've defined it takes formulas of P A i to formulas of the form (1), but allows for the possibility that either quantifier in the translation is absent. This nonuniformity will cause problems in Section 5.5, where we need to assume that every formula is mapped to something strictly in this form. We can achieve this by mapping atomic formulas t 1 = t 2 to ∃u ∈ N ∀v ∈ N equals(t In what follows, we'll use · D0 to denote this modified form of the interpretation.
5 Interpreting ID 1 in P 1
Interpreting ID
Having fixed the interpretation of P A in P 0 , we now turn to the interpretation of ID 1 in P 1 . The first step is to reduce ID 1 to the theory Σ formulas. The method given below is due to Aczel (see [15] ) and hinges on the following 
∀x(ϕ(x, {z | ψ(z)}/X) ↔ ψ(x)).
Here t ∈ {z | ψ(z)} should be interpreted as ψ(t).
Proof (sketch).
The proof is similar to the proof of Gödel's fixed-point lemma: we use a complete Σ 
ϕ(x, {z | T r Σ (y, y, z)}/X).
Since X occurs only positively in ϕ, Σ formula θ(y, x) (the axiom of choice is used to bring the second-order quantifiers out front), and so equivalent to T r Σ ( θ , y, x). Replacing y by θ on both sides of the equivalence we get
We can therefore take ψ(x) to be the formula T r Σ ( θ , θ , x).
This gives us the interpretation of ID 1 into Σ 1 1 -AC, since we can interpret the fixed-point predicates by the corresponding formulas ψ given by the lemma. Induction in ID 1 reduces to induction in Σ where ϕ is an arithmetic formula. (Remember that in both of these axioms, as well as the classical versions, we are taking existential quantification to be defined in terms of universal quantification and negation.) We are not claiming that (Σ 1 1 -AC i ) is the "correct" intuitionistic translation of (Σ 1 1 -AC); only that it is strong enough for our current interpretation and weak enough to be interpreted at the next stage.
The · N0 -translation extends to a new translation · N1 , obtained by adding the clause (t ∈ X) N1 = ¬¬t ∈ X to cover the new atomic formulas t ∈ X.
Proof. As in the case of P A, the interpretation verifies classical logic C 2 , where the double-negation in front of formulas t ∈ X guarantees that the translations of the law of the excluded middle can be derived in I 2 . Translations of instances of (ACA) follow from instances of (ACA i ), using the fact that intuitionistic logic proves the equivalence of ¬¬ϕ N1 (which is equal to (¬¬ϕ) N1 ) and ϕ N1 . Finally, over the other axioms of Σ use arithmetic comprehension to define a set X so that X y = X y,uy for each y, where u y is the least value of u satisfying ϕ(x, X y,u ); this X then satisfies the conclusion of (Σ In Section 6 we will need to extend the above interpretation to theories with fixed-point axioms. Define the theory ID i 1 to be the theory ID 1 based on the intuitionistic fragment I 1 , and extend the · N0 -translation to the language of this theory by adding the clause
The · N 1 -translation of a fixed-point axiom of ID 1 is now of the form
which is a fixed-point axiom of ID i 1 . We only need to verify that the interpretation of the classical axiom ¬¬ψ → ψ holds when ψ is an atomic formula of the form P ϕ (t); but this follows from (5) and the equivalence of ¬¬ϕ N0 and ϕ N0 . Define · N 0 to be another name for the N 0 -translation, and inductively define · N n+1 by adding the clause
to the definition of · N n . Also, let · Nn+1 be the extension of · N n to second-order logic as above. Then just as in the case of P A and Σ 1 1 -AC we can prove
The theory Frege-P A i
This section introduces a theory called Frege-P A i . Although this system is designed to be a stepping-stone for the interpretation of Σ
possible that the underlying ideas may prove useful in other proof-theoretic contexts as well. In his work on the foundations of mathematics, Frege identified formulas with mappings from their free variables to a truth values. He then interpreted quantifiers as higher-order mappings, taking formula-mappings to truth values, initiating a process that can be continued to even higher orders as well. We've named the theory Frege-P A i after him because it makes these characterizations explicit: a formula ϕ(x) gives rise to a map N → P rop, where elements of type P rop are either true or not, and quantifiers are interpreted as maps from N → P rop to P rop. Once we've begun treating formulas as functions returning truth values, all of a sudden we will find ourselves with additional means for defining new formulas, using, say, composition and primitive recursion. Such possibilities form the basis of Frege-P A i .
4
Consider the following example. In the language of arithmetic, we can define a formula ψ(x) that represents the empty set; for example, 0 = 1 will do. Given a predicate variable X, we can also define a formula ϕ(x, X) specifying what it means to be in the Turing jump of X; namely ∃z T (x, 0, z, X), where T (x, 0, z, X) is a form of Kleene's predicate asserting that z codes a halting computation of Turing machine x with oracle X, acting on input 0. Using ψ and ϕ we can then define succesive elements of the jump hierarchy, defining
If we could somehow define the J predicates uniformly, i.e. define a formula H(n, x) equivalent to J n (x), we could then define the ωth jump of the empty set. Of course, this takes us outside the realm of P A, since H(n, X) would provide us with an adequate truth definition for formulas of P A. But Frege-P A i was designed for just this kind of task. In this theory, defining H(n, X) involves a simple instance of primitive recursion.
Frege-P A i is built on a finite type structure like that of T . In fact, for each ordinal notation α < ε 0 , Frege-P A i allows us to define formulas representing αth Turing-jump of the empty set, just as in T we can define terms representing functions in the <ε 0 fast-growing hierarchy (see [26] ).
In Frege-P A i there are four types of judgements:
1. A type, asserting that A denotes a type 2. a ∈ A, asserting that the term a denotes an element of type A 3. a = b ∈ A, asserting that the terms a and b denote equal elements of A
For terms a of type P rop, the judgement a T rue, asserting that the proposition denoted by a is true
The term-forming rules of Frege-P A i are more like those of T than the theories P n , in that terms are terms and types are types and there is no confusion between the two. Using term-forming operations one can construct formulas (terms of type P rop) which are just like the formulas of ordinary P A i , only more complex. And, as in ordinary P A i , there are rules by which certain well-formed formulas can be shown to be true on the basis of the axioms. 
Types of Frege-P
Terms of Frege-P
10. Implication: Implies ∈ P rop × P rop → P rop 11. Conjunction: And ∈ P rop × P rop → P rop
Falsity: F alse ∈ P rop
The first few type-and term-building rules are just those of T . The meaning of the last few functionals on the previous list should be intuitively clear: Equals takes two terms a and b and returns the proposition a = b, Implies takes two propositions ϕ and ψ and returns the proposition ϕ → ψ, and so on. The functional F orall deserves further comment. If ϕ(x) is an element of P rop with free variable x ∈ N, then the term λx.ϕ(x) is of type N → P rop, and the term F orall(λx.ϕ(x)) is the element of P rop that denotes, intuitively, the proposition ∀x ϕ(x). In order to have our notation agree with more common usage, below we will write F orall x ϕ(x) for F orall(λx.ϕ(x)), ϕ Implies ψ for Implies(ϕ, ψ), and so on. We will also omit parentheses according to the usual conventions of predicate logic.
The rules for determining that two terms of Frege-P A i are equal are no different from those of T . Note that the equality symbol of Frege-P A i has nothing per se to do with the Equals functional, though rules given later on will allow us to derive the assertion Equals(a, b) T rue from a = b, for any terms a and b of type N.
Equality of terms in Frege-P
a ∈ A a = a ∈ A 2. Symmetry:
The equality rules just presented have little to say about the logical functions Implies, F orall, and so on. The rules we've seen so far give us mechanisms to define complex elements of the type P rop, as well as ways of showing that certain elements of P rop are in a sense the same.
There is a natural map taking terms t in the language of arithmetic to terms t of type N in Frege-P A i . Similarly, we can map formulas ϕ in the language of arithmetic to elements ϕ of type P rop in the language of Frege-P A i , by taking atomic formulas t 1 = t 2 to t 1 Equals t 2 , formulas ϕ → ψ to ϕ Implies ψ, and so on. If Φ(ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ) is a schema involving the formulas ϕ 1 (x 1 , . . . , x k ) to ϕ n (x 1 , . . . , x k ), we we define Φ by replacing each ϕ i with a corresponding variable of type N k → P rop; an instance of Φ is obtained by substituting appropriate terms for the variables. Similarly, an instance of a rule
is also obtained by replacing variables by specific terms. We can now present the rules concerning 
More explicitly, clauses 1 and 2 include the propositional schemata, schemata involving quantifiers, equality axioms, the defining equations for succesor, plus, and times, and finally the induction rule. It should be clear that Frege-P A i is an extension of P A i . However, since Frege-P A i is built on intuitionistic logic I 1 , the law of the excluded middle ¬¬ϕ → ϕ does not necessarily hold for arbitrary ϕ ∈ P rop.
Note that we have
so that if Frege-P A i proves that two terms a and b of type P rop are equal, then by substitution it also proves a Iff b T rue.
Interpreting
In this section we describe a Dialectica-style interpretation of Σ 
where ϕ F1 is a term of Frege-P A i of type A × B → P rop. Once again, we allow for the possibility that either quantifier is absent. We'll then show, as in Section 4.2, that from a proof of ϕ in Σ 1 1 -AC we can extract a term witnessing the existential quantifier of (6). For arithmetic ϕ, ϕ F1 will be just ϕ T rue, so that arithmetic formulas become "quantifier-free" in the translation.
The · F1 mapping is very similar to the · D1 mapping. One key difference is in the clause for implication. In Section 4.2 verifying the interpretation of the rule ϕ → ψ, ϕ → θ ⇒ ϕ → ψ ∧ θ required a "definition by cases" dependent on the truth value of a quantifier-free formula. In Frege-P A i the "quantifier-free" formulas are arithmetic, and the theory does not provide the means to define a function dependent on the truth of a term in P rop. As a result, we have to use a trick due to Diller and Nahm [11] which avoids the need for such functions.
We start by defining (t 1 = t 2 ) F1 to be t 1 Equals t 2 T rue and once variables X ∈ N → P rop are assigned to set variables X of Σ 
Note that in the second line we replace
Intuitively, we're replacing elements y by sequences of elements λu.y(u). (In the Diller-Nahm interpretation one uses finite sequences of elements, which would work here also; for our purposes, using infinite sequences is sufficient and simplifies the notation.) The interpretations of the other propositional connectives remain the same:
and ⊥ F1 is given by F alse T rue. The translation of second-order quantifiers is also as before: ∀Z ϕ(Z) is translated to
where z is of type N → P rop. More interesting is the interpretation of a firstorder quantifier: ∀z ϕ(z) is translated to
In other words, the first-order universal quantifier is absorbed by the "quantifierfree" part of ϕ F1 .
Theorem 5. The verification of first-order axioms is routine, with induction and axioms regarding implication handled as in [11] . (ACA i ) F1 is easily taken care of: axioms (ACA i ) are of the form
and their · F1 -translations are of the form
where x is of type N → (N → P rop); note that the "F orall u" arises from the Diller-Nahm interpretation of a negation. 5 We need a term a to witness the existential quantifier; taking a = λuλy.ϕ F1 (y) suffices.
Axioms (Σ Given an a witnessing the left-hand side, we need to define an a witnessing the right. Defining a = λvλw.a(w 00 , w 01 , w 1 ) yields a (v, u, y , t ) = a(u, y, t) for any term t, and hence
We can use this to show As in Section 4.2, though we initially allowed for the possibility that either quantifier is absent in the definition of ϕ F1 , we now want to rule out this possibility. We can bring this about by translating the atomic formula t 1 = t 2 to ∃u ∈ N ∀v ∈ N t 1 Equals t 2 T rue where u and v don't appear in t 1 or t 2 , and similarly for atomic formas X(t). This has the net effect that arithmetic formulas ϕ are translated to formulas ∃u ∈ A ∀v ∈ Bφ T rue where u and v don't appear inφ. Once again we can show that this doesn't harm Theorem 5.6 or Corollary 5.7, and so from now on we adopt this modified translation as · F1 .
Interpreting Frege-P
Frege-P A i looks a lot like T , except that formulas of P A i are "reflected down" to quantifier-free formulas. Similarly, P 1 looks a lot like T , except that types of P 0 are "reflected down" to the universe U 0 . Since P A i is interpreted in P 0 , it might seem plausible that Frege-P A i can be interpreted in P 1 . In this section we will show that this is indeed the case.
To interpret Frege-P A i in P 1 we will translate types A of the former system to types A D1 of the latter, and terms a ∈ A to terms a D1 ∈ A D1 . To motivate the definition of P rop D1 , remember that in the Dialectica interpretation formulas ϕ of P A i are mapped to assertions ϕ D0 of the form ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B f (x, y) = 0
where A and B are types of P 0 and f is of a term of type A × B → N. In Frege-P A i , terms of type P rop are represent generalized formulas of P A i , so it makes sense to define
We can now interpret terms ϕ ∈ P rop of Frege-P A i by elements A, B, f of P rop D1 , in such a way that if Frege-P A i proves ϕ T rue then P 1 proves (7); that is, there is a term a ∈ A such that P 1 proves f (a, y) = 0 (y ∈ B). This is done by "internalizing" the Dialectica interpretation, so that the propositional maps Implies, And, and F orall of Frege-P A i translate to the corresponding operations on elements of P rop.
A small technical complication arises with this approach. The verification of the rule ϕ ⇒ ψ → ϕ in Section 4 relied on the existence of "canonical elements" of each type, given by Lemma 4.5. Unfortunately, we cannot generate such elements uniformly; that is, there is no functional Canon ∈ Π X∈U0 X that provides an element Canon(A) ∈ A for each type A of U 0 . However, we can pick a canonical element of type N (e.g. 0), and given canonical elements for the types appearing in ϕ D0 and ψ D0 we can get canonical elements for the types appearing in (ϕ → ψ) D0 , (ϕ ∧ ψ) D0 , and so on. So the solution is to leave room for these elements in P rop D1 . In short, we set 
, and let the map · D1 commute with explicit definition, application, pairing, projection, and primitive recursion.
All that is left to do is define the action of · D1 on the P rop-valued functions Implies, And, F alse, Equals, and F orall. To define
We can then define
Similarly, we define 
Now we must consider the possibility that A and B also depend on z, so that in general ϕ(z) D1 is given by
Instead of N → A and N × B we now use the dependent product and sum types, and define (∀z
In short, we define
This completes the definition of · D1 . 
If Frege-P
A i proves a ∈ A then P 1 proves a D1 ∈ A D1 . 3. If Frege-P A i proves a = b ∈ A then P 1 proves a D1 = b D1 ∈ A D1 . 4. Let d ∈ P rop in Frege-P A i , and suppose Frege-P A i proves d T rue. Then P 1 proves ∃x ∈ d D1 0 ∀y ∈ d D1 1 d D1 2 (x, y) = 0.
In other words, there is a term t ∈ d
D1
0 whose free variables correspond to those of d such that P 1 proves
The details of the proof are routine, and can be found in [5] 
and if Frege-P A i proves F alse T rue then P 1 proves 1 = 0. 
Putting it all together
Since the · Σ1N1F1P1 mapping agrees with the · N0D0 mapping on arithmetic formulas, we get the following 
Iterating the Interpretation
In Section 4 we showed how to interpret P A in P 0 . In Section 5 we saw that this interpretation was "uniform" enough to allow for the interpretation of Frege-P A i in P 1 and hence, ultimately, the interpretation of ID 1 . This interpretation can in turn be lifted to an interpretation of Frege-ID i 1 in P 2 , yielding an interpretation of ID 2 , and so on up the hierarchy.
The interpretation of P A in P 0 ran The idea is as follows. In interpreting Frege-P A i in P 1 , we used the interpretation of P A i in P 0 to define functions Implies D1 , And D1 , F alse D1 , Equals D1 , and F orall D1 , returning values in
This enabled us to translate terms t ∈ P rop of Frege-P A i to terms t D1 ∈ P rop
D1
of P 1 in such a way that axioms and rules of P A were preserved. We can repeat this maneuver to interpret Frege-ID i 1 in P 2 . According to Theorem 5.10, the interpretation of ID 1 takes formulas ϕ of that theory to formulas ϕ Σ1N1F1P1 of the form ∃x ∈ A ∀y ∈ B ∃w ∈ (f (x, y)) 0 ∀z ∈ (f (x, y)) 1 (f (x, y)) 2 (w, z) = 0
where A and B are types of P 1 and f ∈ A × B → P rop D1 . Since the type building operations of P 1 can be mirrored by operations on the universe U 1 of P 2 , we can define Here "interpreted" has to be construed in the appropriate sense. Since all the interpretations are essentially the Dialectica interpretation when restricted to on arithmetic formulas, we have Corollary 6.2 Suppose ID n proves a formula ϕ involving none of the fixedpoint constants. Then P n proves ϕ N0D0 . In particular, if ID n proves ∀x ∃y ψ(x, y) where ψ is quantifier free, there is a term t such that P n proves ψ (x, t(x)) = 0 (x ∈ N), and if ID n proves ⊥ then P n proves 1 = 0.
But this is just our main result, Theorem 1.1.
Final Comments
When we began this project we were looking for a functional interpretation of AT R 0 in a theory like P <ω . As it turns out, the fact that P <ω is "stratified" whereas AT R 0 is not, together with the speedup result given by Theorem 1.2, makes a direct interpretation unlikely. This, however, suggests an interesting question: is there a "second-order" version of P <ω in which AT R 0 can be interpreted directly?
Can one prove that a reduction procedure for closed terms of P n is strongly normalizing? If this could be carried out via an assignment of ordinals to terms as in [31, 20] , the result, combined with the analysis in this paper, would provide an alternate route to the ordinal analysis of ID <ω .
We'd like to see this work extended to stronger systems. Proof-theoretic investigations by Spector [30] and Girard [17] have shown that bar recursion and an impredicative form of polymorphism suffice to interpret full second-order arithmetic. Can fragments and variants of these schemata be used to interpret other classical theories? We feel that such interpretations serve to illuminate the classical strength of computational schemata, as well as the "constructive content" of classical reasoning.
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